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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988), as a case transferred to 
the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
This action was brought by the plaintiff/respondent, 
Gary Solomon, et al., in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, on or about April 29, 198 6. 
Following discovery, the plaintiffs/respondents Solomon, and 
third-party defendants/respondents Manufacturers Life Insurance 
Company, brought motions for summary judgment against the 
appellant University Financial Concepts, Inc. On or about May 
12, 1988 and May 26, 1988, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy 
granted the respondents1 separate Motions for Summary 
Judgment. The appellant filed its Notice of Appeal on June 10, 
1988. 
There are no determinative Constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or ordinances applicable in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Southwest Policy 
1. Did the Court err in holding as a matter of 
law that UFCI was negligent. 
2. Did the Court err in ruling that Fred J. 
Solomon's nine-month early interest payment was not evidence 
of contributory negligence. 
3. Did the Court err in ruling that Fred J. 
Solomon was not contributorily negligent in failing to heed 
numerous warnings regarding the imminent lapse of his life 
insurance policy. 
4. Did the Court err in ruling that Fred J. 
Solomon was not contributorily negligent by his intentional 
act of committing suicide. 
5. Did the Court err in ruling that as a matter 
of law, the Southwest policy would not have been reinstated. 
-2 
ManuLife Policy 
1. Did the Court err in holding as a matter of 
law that UFCI was negligent. 
2. Did the Court err in ruling that Fred J. 
Solomon was not contributorily negligent in failing to 
timely make his third-year interest payment on his life 
insurance policy. 
3. Did the Court err in ruling that the November 
2, 1984 agreement between UFCI and ManuLife was neither 
ambiguous, nor contained an unlawful forfeiture clause. 
4. Did the Court err in ruling that the November 
2, 1984 agreement between UFCI and ManuLife did not keep 
the Fred J. Solomon policy in force notwithstanding the 
waiver by ManuLife of the payment terms of the contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
From 1980 through 1987, UFCI sold whole life 
insurance under a program called "premium financing." This 
program involved a loan by UFCI to the insured of the first 
year's premiums on the whole life policy. The insured would 
execute a promissory note in favor of UFCI for the first 
premium. The note would be payable in ten annual interest 
payments with a balloon payment of the principal at the end of 
the ten-year term. The insured would then assign the cash 
value of the particular policy to UFCI which would in turn 
invest the cash values and use them to pay subsequent annual 
premiums. The plaintiff's decedent, Fred J. Solomon, 
purchased two policies from UFCI under this premium financing 
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plan. One policy, with a face value of $500,000.00, was 
written with Manufacturers Life Insurance Company (hereinafter 
"ManuLife"), and the other policy, with a face value of 
$250,000.00, was written with Life Insurance Company of the 
Southwest (hereinafter "Southwest"). During the third year of 
both policies, Fred J. Solomon committed suicide. Both 
Southwest and ManuLife denied coverage claiming each of their 
policies had lapsed prior to Solomon's suicide. 
Fred J. Solomon's heirs brought a negligence action 
against UFCI for its failure to keep both the ManuLife and 
the Southwest policy in force. UFCI denied any negligence, 
and further alleged that the plaintiff's decedent was 
contributorily negligent in causing the loss. In addition, 
UFCI filed a Third-Party Complaint for indemnity against 
ManuLife, for its failure to keep the ManuLife policy in 
force during the second year of the policy's existence. 
Following discovery, ManuLife and the plaintiffs 
brought motions for summary judgment against UFCI. The 
plaintiffs brought their motion based on UFCI's alleged 
negligence in failing to keep both the ManuLife and the 
Southwest policy in force. ManuLife's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was based on their claim that they had the legal right 
to terminate the Solomon policy during the second year of its 
existence. Both motions were argued before the Honorable 
Michael R. Murphy who granted both ManuLife and the 
plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment. (Decision attached 
hereto as Exhibit A). 
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UFCI now appeals these decisions and alleges that 
Judge Murphy erred in several respects as contained in 
Statement of Issues on Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Since the facts change significantly when discussing 
the ManuLife policy versus the Southwest policy, the relevant 
facts for each policy will be set out in two separate sections, 
entitled "ManuLife Policy" and "Southwest Policy." 
ManuLife Policy 
1. Between 1980 and 1987, UFCI sold whole life 
insurance under a program referred to in the industry as 
"premium financing". (Berrett Deposition, page 15.) 
2. Under the UFCI premium financing program, 
UFCI loaned the insured the first year's premium on the whole 
life policy. The insured executed a promissory note to UFCI 
for the amount of the first premium, with ten annual interest 
payments and a balloon principal payment at the end of the ten 
years. The due date of the interest payments to UFCI 
coincided with the policy anniversary dates. (Berrett 
Deposition, pp. 25-27.) 
3. At the onset of the policy, the insured 
executed three policy loan agreements in favor of UFCI, 
whereby the cash values of the whole life policy were assigned 
to UFCI. UFCI was to invest these cash values and use them 
to pay subsequent years1 premiums. (Berrett Deposition, p. 
27.) 
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4. On or about September 5, 1983, UFCI sold 
the plaintiff's decedent, Fred J, Solomon, a whole life 
insurance policy through ManuLife in the face amount of 
$500,000. (Berrett Deposition, pp. 51, 52.) 
5. Solomon executed the standard UFCI note 
relating to the ManuLife policy, which called for annual 
interest payments at 8 percent on the principal sum of 
$3 0,615.00. This resulted in an annual interest payment of 
$2,449.20. (UFCI's response to Fourth Request for 
Admissions, Requests Nos. 1 and 2.) 
6. If Solomon made interest payments of 
$2,449.20 on or before October 5 of each of the first three 
years of the ManuLife policy, UFCI had a duty to keep the 
policy in force. (UFCI's response to Fourth Request for 
Admissions, Request No. 3.) 
7. UFCI billed Solomon $2,449.20 for the 
first year's interest on the ManuLife policy and Solomon 
paid it on September 30, 1983, which was a timely payment of 
interest. Thereafter, UFCI paid the first year's premium to 
ManuLife. (Berrett Deposition, pp. 58-60.) 
8. UFCI billed Solomon $2,449.20 for the 
second year's interest on the ManuLife policy and Solomon 
paid it on September 18, 1984 which was a timely payment. 
(Berrett Deposition, pp. 63-64.) Because of financial 
difficulties UFCI was experiencing in the second year of the 
Solomon policy, UFCI did not pay the second year premiums 
on a number of policies, including Fred Solomon's policy, and 
those policies lapsed. (Berrett Deposition, pp. 71, 143.) 
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9. UFCI and ManuLife reached an agreement 
whereby the policies that had lapsed due to nonpayment would be 
covered by "extended term insurance" and eventually reinstated 
under their whole life provisions through the payment by UFCI 
of those premiums that were past due. This Agreement was 
memorialized in a letter dated November 2, 1984. (Agreement, 
attached hereto as Exhibit B). 
10. The terms of the November 2, 1984 Agreement 
between ManuLife and UFCI were drafted by representatives 
of ManuLife, without input of representatives from UFCI. 
(Smithen Deposition at p. 38; Berrett Affidavit dated 
3/15/88 attached hereto as Exhibit C ) 
11. Mr. Sherrell Berrett, President of 
UFCI, understood that the initial $50,000.00 payment under 
the agreement was to provide term insurance for all lapsed 
policies during that particular policy year, and that the 
additional $25,000.00 weekly payments were to be used to 
maintain current policies and reinstate lapsed whole life 
policies, including Solomon's. (Affidavit of Sherrell 
Berrett attached as Exhibit C ) 
12. Robert Smithen, an actuary with ManuLife, 
drafted the November 2, 1984 Agreement with the assistance of 
his legal department. (Smithen Deposition, p. 6.) 
13. Robert Smithen left the administration of 
the November 2, 1984 Agreement to another employee of 
ManuLife, Ronald Klein. (Smithen Deposition, p. 15.) 
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14. Ronald Klein was not involved in any way with 
the negotiation or drafting of the November 2, 1984 Agreement, 
(Smithen Deposition, p. 6,) 
15. Although Ronald Klein was not involved in any 
way with the drafting of the November 2, 1984 Agreement, he was 
left to administer the Agreement to the best of his ability 
without guidance from the drafter of the document, Robert 
Smithen. (Smithen Deposition, p. 15.) 
16. Ronald Klein was not consistent in the way he 
applied the monies received from UFCI under the November 2, 
1984 Agreement. (Klein Deposition, pp. 80-81, 86.) 
17. Robert Smithen did not check to see that 
Mr. Klein applied the monies received from UFCI according to 
the terms of the November 2, 1984 Agreement. (Smithen 
Deposition, p. 27.) 
18. UFCI never received notification of any 
kind from ManuLife regarding those policies that were 
reinstated under the Agreement, or alternatively, that there 
were any policies that had not been reinstated under the 
Agreement. (Berrett Deposition attached as Exhibit C.) 
19. Although UFCI did not always make weekly 
$25,000.00 payments as directed by the November 2, 1984 
Agreement, ManuLife continued to accept and apply late 
payments made by UFCI. UFCI paid $293,000.00 to ManuLife 
under the Agreement. (Klein Deposition, pp. 110-111.) 
20. UFCI unilaterally terminated the November 
2, 1984 Agreement in March or April of 1985. (Klein 
Deposition, p. 34; Smithen Deposition, p. 54.) 
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21. In May of 1985, UFCI tendered an $18,000.00 
check to ManuLife. ManuLife retained possession of that 
check, and in fact still has that check in one of their 
"suspense accounts," but never applied that check to reinstate 
lapsed policies. (Klein Deposition, p. 34; Smithen 
Deposition, p. 54.) 
22. UFCI was never notified that the $18,000.00 
payment made in May of 1985 was not applied to any policies. 
(Klein Deposition, p. 96; Berrett Affidavit attached as 
Exhibit C ) 
23. The premium on the ManuLife policy for the 
third year was due on September 5, 1985. The grace period 
allowed the ManuLife policy to remain in force through 
October 6, 1985. Fred J. Solomon did not tender his 
third-year interest payment to UFCI until October 28, 1985, 
22 days after the policy had already lapsed. 
Life of the Southwest Policy 
24. The premium financing program described in 
the facts section for the ManuLife policy is the same program 
used in the Southwest policy. 
25. On or about December 28, 1983, UFCI sold 
Fred Solomon a whole life insurance policy through Life 
Insurance Company of the Southwest in the face amount of 
$250,000.00. (Berrett Deposition, pp. 94-95.) Solomon 
executed the standard UFCI note relating to the Southwest 
policy, which called for annual interest payments at 8 percent 
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of the principal sum of $15,630.00. This resulted in an annual 
interest payment of $1,250.40. (Berrett Deposition, p. 95.) 
26. Solomon paid the first year's interest on 
the Southwest policy on or about January 25, 1984, which was a 
timely payment. Thereafter, UFCI paid the first year's 
premium to Southwest. (Berrett Deposition, pp. 98, 99.) 
27. Solomon paid the second year's interest 
payment on the Southwest policy on or about December 18, 1984, 
which was a timely payment. UFCI then paid the premiums to 
Southwest. (Berrett deposition, pp. 101, 102, 104.) 
28. On or about March 4, 1985, Solomon, only 
three months after making his previous interest payment and 10 
months prior to the third year's interest becoming due, sent a 
check to UFCI in the amount of $1,250.40. (Debbie Miller 
Affidavit, paragraph 3.) 
29. This check was received at UFCI with no 
notations or explanations from Mr. Solomon as to the purpose 
of the check. 
30. As the time approached for payment of the 
third year's interest on the Southwest policy, Mr. Solomon 
was contacted by UFCI officials, as well as Life of the 
Southwest officials reminding him that the payment was due. 
(Affidavit of Pamela Finch attached hereto as Exhibit E, and 
Affidavit of Sherrell Berrett, attached hereto as Exhibit 
F.) 
31. The president of UFCI, Sherrell 
Berrett, personally contacted Mr. Solomon the Monday before 
his death in February of 198 6 and reiterated the necessity of 
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his paying the third year interest payment on the policy which 
had now actually lapsed. Although Mr. Solomon promised that 
he would send a check to Mr. Berrett by the end of the week 
so that the Southwest policy could be reinstated, he failed to 
do so and then committed suicide. (Berrett Affidavit, 
Exhibit F; Autopsy Report, Death Certificate and Toxicology 
Report attached hereto as Exhibit D.) 
32. Mr. Solomon had several episodes of 
suicidal depression prior to 1983. Notwithstanding those 
episodes of depression which were known to Southwest, Southwest 
issued him a life insurance policy in the amount of 
$250,000.00. (Psychiatric Evaluation of Mr. Solomon attached 
hereto as Exhibit G. This exhibit was attached as Exhibit B to 
an affidavit of Douglas Niell, submitted by the plaintiffs in 
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Supreme Court has been very explicit in its 
standard of review on appeals from summary judgment. In 
Zion's First Nat' 1 Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 92 Utah 
Adv. Rpt., 34 (Sept. 30, 1988), the court stated: 
In reviewing the record on any appeal from 
summary judgment, we treat the statements 
and evidentiary materials of the appellant 
as if a jury would receive them as the only 
credible evidence, and we sustain the 
judgment only if no issues of fact which 
could affect the outcome can be discerned. 
Id. at 35. (Emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court also stated in Hardy v. Prudential Insurance 
Company, 89 Utah Adv. Rpt., 34 (Aug. 24, 1988), that: 
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After reviewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to the appellant, if we consider 
there is a dispute as to a material issue 
of fact, we must reverse the trial 
court's determination and remand to the 
trial court on that issue. (Citations 
omitted.) Courts cannot weigh disputed 
material facts in ruling on a summary 
judgment motion. (Citations omitted). It 
is of no moment that the evidence on one 
side may appear to be strong or even 
compelling. (Citations omitted). It only 
takes one competent sworn statement under 
oath to dispute the averments on the other 
side of the controversy and create an issue 
of fact. (Citations omitted). 
Id. at 36. (Emphasis added). 
Clearly, this case must be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the appellant, UFCI, and the judgment can only 
be sustained if no issues of fact can be discerned. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
ManuLife Policy 
This is a negligence action brought by Solomon's 
heirs against UFCI. UFCI in turn brought a third-party 
action against ManuLife for indemnification. In answering 
plaintiff's allegations, UFCI denied that it was negligent in 
causing the lapse of the ManuLife policy and strongly 
maintained that Solomon's own negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of the lapse of the Solomon policy. 
After hearing arguments from both sides, Judge Murphy 
held that the ManuLife policy lapsed in its second year of 
existence. This was error. Evidence exists that the 
ManuLife policy was in full force and effect during its 
second year pursuant to an agreement signed between ManuLife 
and UFCI on November 2, 1984. Judge Murphy held that 
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ManuLife had the right to unilaterally terminate this 
contract since it was unambiguous by its terms. This also was 
in error. Serious ambiguities exist in the Agreement which 
raise questions of fact. Judge Murphy also held that the 
Agreement did not contain an unconscionable forfeiture, bur 
gave no reasons for this decision. This was error. Finally, 
the Court held that the Agreement could be unilaterally 
terminated by ManuLife without ManuLife first reinstating 
previously waived conditions of the contract. The Court also 
erred in making this decision. 
Since the Solomon policy was in full force and 
effect during the second year of its existence, it actually 
lapsed in the third year, which lapse was due to Solomon's 
failure to timely make his third-year interest payment to 
UFCI. Solomon made his third-year interest payment to 
UFCI nearly one month after the policy had lapsed. 
Therefore, his own negligence constitutes the sole proximate 
cause of the lapse. 
Southwest Policy 
Plaintiffs again alleged negligence against UFCI 
for its failure to keep the Southwest policy in force. UFCI 
denied that it was negligent. UFCI maintained below that its 
conduct was in keeping with the required standard of conduct. 
Plaintiffs failed to bring forth any expert witnesses or 
affidavits regarding the standard of conduct applicable in this 
case, or the alleged departure from that standard. Plaintiffs 
instead relied upon statements by former employees of UCFI to 
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the effect that they may have done things differently in 
retrospect; this, however, falls far short of establishing the 
breach of a standard of conduct. The Court erred in holding 
that UFCI was negligent as a matter of law on the basis of 
this scant evidence. 
UFCI also pled Solomon's contributory negligence 
as a defense below. Judge Murphy held that Solomon's 
conduct, in failing to make the third year interest payment, or 
at least alleging that he had already made that payment, raised 
a genuine issue of material fact as to Solomon's own 
negligence. Judge Murphy further held that Solomon's 
negligence was material notwithstanding the plaintiff's claim 
that Solomon had in fact made his third year payment. 
However, Judge Murphy ultimately held that Solomon's 
negligence was immaterial since UFCI did not establish that 
Southwest would have reinstated the Southwest policy. In so 
deciding, Judge Murphy erred. 
Judge Murphy erred because Solomon's negligence 
certainly contributed to the lapse of the Southwest policy. 
Solomon's negligence first manifest itself when he sent a 
check to UFCI nine months in advance of any premium 
anniversary date without any indication of the purpose or 
intent of the check. Mr. Solomon was contacted on several 
occasions both by employees of Southwest and employees of 
UFCI who informed him that his third year premium was due on 
the Southwest policy. Mr. Solomon never alleged that he had 
already paid that premium, but instead assured UFCI officials 
that he would deliver the required interest payment 
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immediately. When Solomon failed to make his payment and the 
policy lapsed, he was again contacted and given the opportunity 
to reinstate his policy. The evidence before the Court below 
clearly established that the policy would have in fact been 
reinstated by Southwest had the premium been paid. 
UFCI further maintained below that Solomon was 
contributorily negligent in causing the lapse of the 
Southwest policy by committing suicide prior to either making 
his third year payment, or resolving any confusion between 
himself and UFCI regarding that third year payment. The 
Court mistakenly rejected this argument. 
Under both the ManuLife and Southwest policies and 
facts, there are numerous issues of fact upon which reasonable 
minds could differ. These issues of fact preclude summary 




UFCI WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN ITS ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE MANULIFE POLICY. 
In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment 
in a negligence action, the plaintiff must establish that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, and that reasonable 
minds could not differ on whether the defendant's conduct 
measured up to the required standard of care. See, Jackson 
v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). 
The essential elements that the plaintiff must prove 
in this action are that (1) UFCI owed a duty of reasonable 
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care to the plaintiff; (2) that a breach of that duty occurred; 
(3) that the breach both actually and proximately caused the 
loss; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result. 
William v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). 
In attempting to satisfy this heavy burden of proof, 
the plaintiffs rely on statements made by former employees of 
UFCI regarding "mistakes" that may have been made, or things 
they may have done differently in retrospect. This testimony 
does not satisfy plaintiff's burden of proof. The plaintiffs 
offered no expert testimony regarding the required standard of 
conduct in the insurance industry and no expert testimony 
regarding any alleged breach of that standard by UFCI. 
Neither did the plaintiffs tender any affidavits by either 
experts, or other members of the insurance industry relating to 
the required conduct in that industry and the supposed breach 
of that conduct by UFCI. It is simply insufficient to 
assume, as Judge Murphy did, that since ManuLife employees 
stated they may have done things differently in retrospect, 
reasonable minds could not differ in identifying that conduct 
as negligence. The fact that one may have done something 
differently given current knowledge does not equate to 
negligence in all cases, and as stated by the Utah supreme 
Court, "whether a defendant has breached the required standard 
of care is generally a question for the jury. . . . " Williams 
v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1983). This is 
particularly true in light of the Court's pronunciation that 
"summary judgment should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases." Id. at 725. (emphasis added). 
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The facts surrounding the ManuLife policy clearly 
reveal disputed issues of fact which must be determined by the 
jury. Perhaps the most critical issue pertaining the 
ManuLife policy is whether that policy lapsed in the second 
year or third year of its existence. If the policy lapsed in 
the second year, then Mr. Solomon's failure to timely make 
his third year interest payment is irrelevant. If, however, 
the policy was in force during the second year, then 
Solomon's failure to make his third year interest payment 
constitutes the sole proximate cause for his loss, or at the 
very least, is evidence of contributory negligence on his 
part. In either case, summary judgment is inappropriate. 
It is undisputed that UFCI did not make the second 
year premium payment on Mr. Solomon's policy and therefore that 
policy lapsed, along with many others. However, ManuLife 
agreed to allow UFCI to reinstate those policies through 
weekly payments to ManuLife of $25,000.00. In addition, it 
was agreed that those policies that had lapsed would remain in 
force in the interim through the initial payment by UFCI to 
ManuLife of $50,000.00. This $50,000.00 payment was to 
provide term insurance on those lapsed policies for one year, 
or until the policy was reinstated through the $25,000.00 
weekly payments. This written agreement is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B. 
ManuLife now claims that although many of those 
lapsed policies were reinstated through the $25,000.00 weekly 
payments made by UFCI, some of the policies, including 
Solomon's, were not reinstated prior to the time ManuLife 
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unilaterally terminated this 11/2/84 agreement. UFCI 
disputed this claim and argued that the 11/2/84 agreement was 
ambiguous, that it contained an unconscionable forfeiture 
clause, and that Manulife unlawfully terminated that 
agreement. 
A. The Terms of the 11/2/84 Agreement Between 
UFCI and ManuLife are Ambiguous and 
Must be Construed Against the Drafter, 
ManuLife. 
It is uncontested that ManuLife drafted the 
November 2, 1984 Agreement. Robert Smithen, a ManuLife 
actuary, admits that he drafted the majority of the Agreement, 
with the help of his legal department. He never discussed or 
negotiated the specific terms of the contract with any 
representatives of UFCI. As far as he was concerned, it was 
a "take it or leave it" proposition for UFCI. (Smithen 
Deposition at pp. 4, 37-38.) 
Sherrell Berrett, the President of UFCI, 
understood the Agreement to provide term coverage for each of 
the policies which had lapsed. This coverage would cost UFCI 
$50,000.00 and would last for the entire policy year of each 
lapsed policy or until the policy was reinstated through the 
weekly payments of $25,000.00 by UFCI to ManuLife. 
ManuLife, on the other hand, understood that the 
$50,000.00 would only provide term insurance so long as UFCI 
made timely $25,000.00 weekly payments. Under Manulife1s 
understanding, it was possible that if UFCI failed to make 
the first $25,000.00 payment, ManuLife could retain the 
$50,000.00 payment, not reinstate even one policy, and then 
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immediately terminate the contract. This $50,000.00 forfeiture 
was not clearly articulated in the 11/2/84 Agreement and was 
certainly not contemplated by UFCI. In addition, the 
contract fails to clearly explain the period of time the 
$50,000.00 initial payment was to cover all lapsed policies 
with term insurance. UFCI had a reasonable expectation that 
its $50,000.00 initial payment would extend term insurance for 
the policy year of each lapsed policy while UFCI endeavored 
to reinstate each of those policies through its $25,000.00 
weekly payments. 
Under Utah law, when an ambiguity exists, that 
ambiguity must be resolved against the party who drafted the 
agreement. See, e.g., Sears v. Rienersma, 655 P.2d, 
1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). Furthermore, the well-established rule 
in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of 
a contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn 
the Agreement. Parks Enterprise v. New Century Realty, Inc., 
652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982) ("It is also settled law that a 
contract will be construed against the drafter"); In Re: The 
Estate of Orris,' 622 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1982) (Language of an 
ambiguous instrument should be construed most strictly against 
the party who drafted the instrument). See, also, 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 206. 
In construing ambiguous contracts, it is the rule of 
law in Utah that "contracts are to be construed in light of the 
reasonable expectations of the parties as envisioned by the 
purpose and language of the contract." Nixon & Nixon, 
Inc. v. John New & Associates, 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982). 
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Ample evidence exists that the purpose of the 11/2/84 Agreement 
was to provide coverage for the lapsed policies while UFCI 
endeavored to make payments sufficient to reinstate those 
policies. This coverage came in the form of a term insurance 
coverage at a cost to UFCI of $50,000.00. A question of fact 
clearly exists with respect to the scope and intent of the 
agreement which precludes summary judgment. 
B. Forfeitures are Abhorred by the Law and 
Strictly Construed Against the Drafter. 
ManuLife attempted to draft a forfeiture clause 
into their November 2, 1984 agreement. Paragraph 9 of the 
Agreement states that "failure to meet any of the requirements 
in clauses 1 to 7 above will result in immediate termination of 
the extended term insurance coverage on all the contracts that 
have not otherwise been reinstated." The practical effect of 
this "termination" language is to give ManuLife the benefit 
of the $50,000.00 term insurance payment without having to 
provide a service for it. For example, had UFCI failed to 
make its first $25,000.00 payment under the Agreement, 
ManuLife could have immediately terminated the 11/2/84 
Agreement, kept the entire $50,000.00, not reinstated one 
policy, and not provided one day of term insurance coverage. 
This unconscionable result promulgated the generally accepted 
rule of law, followed in Utah, which states: 
[Since] the plaintiff had its attorneys 
draft the contract, its provisions should 
be construed most strictly against the 
plaintiffs; and this is especially true as 
to a forfeiture, which is enforced only 
when the terms are clear and unequivocal. 
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Wingets, Inc. v, Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 
(Utah 1972) . 
Because the law abhors a forfeiture and every 
reasonable presumption is made against it, equity in this case 
demands that at the very least, a pro rata portion of the 
$50,000.00 should have been applied to reinstate lapsed 
policies. The November 2, 1984 Agreement was terminated by 
ManuLife in March or April of 1985. If the $50,000.00 term 
insurance was to cover policies for a one-year period, then 
there are seven months of unused term insurance available. 
Accordingly, approximately $29,167.0 of the $50,000.00 should 
have been applied to reinstate lapsed policies rather than 
simply applied to ManuLife!s coffers as a forfeiture. Had 
this occurred, the Solomon policy may have been reinstated. 
This is particularly true in light of the fact that UFCI 
sent an $18,000.00 check to ManuLife under the terms of the 
contract, but ManuLife did not apply that $18,000.00 to any 
of the lapsed policies, nor did ManuLife return that 
$18,000.00 to UFCI. The $18,000.00 plus the $29,000.00 
together would have given ManuLife an additional $47,000.00 
that should have been applied to reinstate lapsed policies, 
including Fred Solomon's policy. 
Notwithstanding this clear forfeiture, Judge Murphy 
failed to address this issue except to state that "this court 
is unwilling to redraft the 11/2/84 agreement so that some 
portion of the allegedly forfeited $50,000.00 can be deemed to 
have been applied to reinstate lapsed policies." A question of 
fact exists as to the nature and extent of the forfeiture 
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provisions and Judge Murphy erred in deciding this issue 
without citation to authority or submitting the issue to a jury. 
Aside from the provision of the Agreement itself, it 
is clear that ManuLife applied the funds received from UFCI 
in a haphazard and inconsistent manner and as a consequence, it 
cannot be determined as a matter of law that the Solomon 
policy was not reinstated. Evidence of ManuLife1s 
inconsistent application of funds is abundant. For example, 
although the contract itself was written by Robert Smithen of 
ManuLife, it was administered by Ronald Klein, who admitted 
that he was left to administer the Agreement to the best of his 
ability without any guidance from the drafters of the 
document. Further, Ronald Klein admits that he was not 
always consistent in the way he applied the monies received 
from UFCI, nor did Robert Smithen ever check to see that 
Ronald Klein was applying the monies received from UFCI 
according to the terms of the November 2, 1984 Agreement. 
ManuLife1s negligence in applying these funds was 
compounded by its failure to tell UFCI which policies had 
been reinstated, or more importantly, which policies allegedly 
had not been reinstated under the 11/2/84 Agreement. These 
questions raise material issue of fact which must be determined 
by a jury. 
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C. ManuLife Waived the Contractual 
Condition of Timely Payments and was, 
Therefore, Estopped from Terminating the 
November 2, 1984 Agreement Without First 
Notifying UFCI that it Would No Longer 
Accept Late Payments. 
It is undisputed that ManuLife accepted late 
payments from UFCI and applied those late payments to 
reinstate lapsed policies. Indeed, ManuLife accepted at 
least three late payments from UFCI and applied at least two 
of those to reinstate lapsed policies. The third late payment, 
a payment of $18,000.00 made sometime in May of 1985 was 
retained, though never applied to reinstate any lapsed 
policies. That $18,000.00 remains in ManuLife1s possession. 
By accepting these late payments, ManuLife waived 
their right to enforce the timely payment provision without 
first notifying UFCI of its intent to enforce the previously 
waived contract condition. Basic Law states that 
After a failure of an express condition or 
a material failure of a constructive 
condition, the party for whose benefit the 
condition exists normally has the power to 
elect to cancel his performance or to 
proceed with the performance . . . An 
election may be, and often is, manifested 
by conduct. Thus, an election to waive a 
condition exists if the promissor 
continues his own performance after 
acceptance and retention of the defective 
performance. 
J. Calamari, J. Perillo, Contracts, § 11-37 
(Second Edition, 1977) . 
Similarly, Corbin states that: 
In any case, the continued recognition of a 
contract as mutually valid and operative 
will prevent the obligee from asserting the 
obligors existing default as a complete 
discharge of his own obligation. The 
acceptance of a delayed payment, whether of 
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part or all of the amount then due, without 
any notice of intention to claim a 
forfeiture or discharge, is operative as a 
waiver with respect to the default that 
then exists . . . . Any expression or 
conduct of the obligee that leads that 
obligor reasonably to believe that 
performance on time will not be insisted on 
will operate as a waiver of the time 
condition, as to subsequent defaults as 
well as to antecedent ones. Such a belief 
by the obligor may be reasonable where it 
is induced by the obligee's receipt of a 
series of delayed payments without 
objection. 
3A Corbin on Contracts, § 754 (1971). 
Utah law states that " . . . parties to written 
contracts may modify, waive, or make new terms regardless of 
the provisions of the contract to the contrary . . . ." 
Dillman v. Ferguson, 369 P.2d 296, 298 (Utah 1962). 
In the case before this Court, it is undisputed that 
ManuLife accepted a series of late payments from UFCI. In 
doing so, ManuLife waived the payment schedule provisions of 
the contract and was thereby estopped from terminating the 
contract due to late payments without first notifying UFCI 
that it now intended to hold UFCI to the contract payment 
schedule. See, Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681, 684 (Utah 
1981). 
After hearing argument, Judge Murphy ruled that the 
doctrine of waiver did not apply in this case because UFCI 
made no further tender after the termination of the contract by 
ManuLife. Neither the plaintiffs below nor Judge Murphy were 
able to cite any authority for that legal proposition. 
Notwithstanding this failure, the record is clear that UFCI 
in fact made a subsequent tender of $18,000.00 which ManuLife 
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refused to apply to anything because the tender arrived 
"after the agreement had been terminated." (Klein 
Deposition, p. 34; Smithen Deposition, p. 54.) Although 
ManuLife refused to apply the funds, ManuLife retained 
possession of the $18,000.00 and to this day it remains in a 
"suspense account" at ManuLife1s home office in Canada. This 
subsequent tender by UFCI satisfies the legal requirements 
espoused by Judge Murphy, and accordingly, the doctrine of 
waiver applies; hence, UFCI wrongfully terminated the 
contract. In short, under the facts of this case, clear 
questions of fact remain regarding waiver and estoppel, 
questions which are to be determined by the jury. Riverside 
v. Ritchie, 650 P.2d 657 (Ida. 1982). 
D. Fred Solomon's Negligence Constitutes 
the Sole Proximate Cause for the Lapse of 
the ManuLife Policy. 
The ManuLife policy was in full force and effect 
during the second year of its existence. The policy actually 
lapsed in its third year due to Mr. Solomon's failure to make 
his third year interest payment to UFCI. The premium on the 
ManuLife policy, for the third year, was due September 5, 
1985. The grace period on the ManuLife policy allowed the 
premium payment to be made as late as October 6, 1985. Mr. 
Solomon did not tender his third year interest payment to 
UFCI until October 28, 1985, a full 22 days after the policy 
had already lapsed. UFCI had no duty to tender a payment to 
ManuLife absent Mr. Solomon's interest payment to UFCI, 
and therefore UFCI did not contribute to the lapse of this 
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policy. Mr. Solomon's failure to make his third year 
interest payment before the policy lapsed is clear evidence of 
negligence which precluded the granting of summary judgment in 
this case. 
POINT II 
UFCI WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN ITS ADMINISTRATION 
OF THE SOUTHWEST POLICY. 
UFCI was not negligent in its administration of the 
Southwest policy. The Southwest policy lapsed during its 
third year. During the first two years, Solomon made his 
required interest payments to UFCI and UFCI made its 
premium payment to Southwest. Solomon failed to make the 
third year interest payment to UFCI and notwithstanding 
numerous warnings from both Southwest officers and UFCI 
officers that he must make his payment in order to reinstate 
the policy, Mr. Solomon killed himself by carbon monoxide 
asphyxiation prior to making his third year interest payment. 
As in the ManuLife policy, Judge Murphy relied on 
insufficient evidence in determining UFCI's negligence. 
See Argument, Point I, pp. 15-16. 
A. Solomon Was Negligent in Tendering an 
Unidentified Check to UFCI on or About 
March 4, 1985. 
Sometime during March of 1985, UFCI received a 
check from Mr. Solomon dated March 4, 1985. This check was 
received without any notation or explanation from Mr. Solomon 
as to its intended use or purpose. This check was received 
less than three months after Mr. Solomon made his second year 
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interest payment and more than nine months before his third 
year premium was due. 
The above facts identify two clear issues of material 
fact to be determined by the jury. First, whether the March 4, 
1985 check was actually intended to pay the third year premium 
on the Southwest policy, and second, whether the tender of this 
check nine months in advance without any explanation from Mr. 
Solomon caused or contributed to the ultimate lapse of the 
Southwest policy. Both questions are issues upon which 
reasonable minds could differ and preclude summary judgment. 
B. Mr. Solomon was Negligent in 
Disregarding Policy Lapse Warnings from 
Both Southwest and UFCI. 
As the time approached for Mr. Solomon to make his 
third year interest payments, Southwest contacted him by letter 
on two separate occasions warning him that he must make his 
premium payments in order to keep his policy in force. The 
first letter was dated December 17, 1985, and the second letter 
was dated January 22, 1986. Both letters provided Mr. 
Solomon with the address where he should send his premium 
payment, as well as a telephone number should he have any 
questions regarding his payment. 
As a follow-up to its prior letters, Southwest sent 
another letter to Solomon on January 29, 1986, stating that 
Solomon's policy had lapsed as of December 28, 1985 because 
his premiums had not been received, and that he could reinstate 
his policy by filling out a questionnaire and tendering his 
premium payment. 
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During this same period of time, Mr. Berrett, 
president of UFCI, was also aware that Solomon's Southwest 
policy had lapsed and, therefore, personally contacted Mr. 
Solomon by phone on or about February 10, 198 6 and offered to 
assist Mr. Solomon in reinstating his policy. Mr. Berrett 
directed Mr. Solomon to send in his interest payment by the 
end of the week. Mr. Solomon assured Mr. Berrett that he 
would do so, but prior to delivering his interest payment, he 
committed suicide. Mr. Solomon never claimed, to either 
Southwest or UFCI that he had already made his third year 
interest payment. Rather, Mr. Solomon assured Mr. Berrett 
that he would personally deliver the interest payment by the 
end of the week. Mr. Solomon's failure to make his third 
year payment, along with his subsequent suicide raises material 
issues of facts regarding his own negligence which preclude 
summary judgment. 
C. Mr. Solomon was Negligent in Taking 
His Own Life Prior to Tendering His 
Third Year Interest Payment, or Clearing 
Up the Confusion Regarding the Third 
Y.ear Interest payment. 
There can be no dispute in the instant case that Mr. 
Solomon committed suicide. The autopsy report, death 
certificate and toxicology report all indicate that Mr. 
Solomon connected a hose to the exhaust pipe of his 
automobile which he then directed into the interior of his car 
where he sat until he eventually died of carbon monoxide 
asphyxiation. At the time of his death, Mr. Solomon was very 
well aware that his Southwest policy had indeed lapsed. He was 
given this information both in writing and in person by 
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officers from UFCI and Southwest. Notwithstanding this 
knowledge, and without ever claiming that he had already made 
his third year payment, Mr. Solomon took his own life. 
Where a plaintiff commits suicide and the defendant 
alleges that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent by 
his act of suicide, it is incumbent upon the court to submit 
that defense to the trier of fact for their determination. So 
held the Oregon Supreme Court in Nelson v. Salem Hospital, 
551 P.2d 476 (Ore. 1976). In Nelson, the plaintiff's 
decedent either fell or jumped from a hospital window and was 
killed. The defendant hospital alleged that the plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent in that he intentionally jumped to 
his death. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and 
the plaintiff appealed claiming that the trial court should not 
have submitted the defendant's theory of contributory 
negligence to the jury. In affirming the trial court's 
decision, the Court stated: 
The plaintiff's only assignment of error is 
that the trial court should not have 
submitted defendant's theory of 
contributory negligence—that the deceased 
voluntarily took his own life—to the 
jury. If we accepted plaintiff's argument, 
it would mean that the jury would have been 
precluded from finding that Smith committed 
suicide. We conclude that the trial court 
correctly submitted this defense to the 
jury. 
Id. at 478; See, also, Kimery v. Public Service 
Commission of Oklahoma, 622 P.2d 1066 (Okla. 1981); 
City of Belen v. Harrell, 603 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1979). 
Judge Murphy, after hearing the evidence on suicide, 
ruled that the evidence raised genuine issues of fact as to 
whether Solomon was negligent, but noted that such evidence 
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was immaterial because UFCI failed to prove the Southwest 
policy would have been reinstated had Solomon made his 
interest payment. This ruling ignores clear evidence that the 
Solomon policy would have been reinstated if Solomon had 
made his interest payment. 
D. The Southwest Policy Would Have Been 
Reinstated had Solomon Made his Payment. 
In reaching his conclusion, referred to above, Judge 
Murphy relied upon an affidavit submitted by plaintiffs, of 
Douglas Neill, senior vice president of Southwest. Mr. 
Neill's affidavit stated in effect that had Southwest known 
Mr. Solomon was treated for depression, they would never 
have reinstated his policy since that would be contrary to 
their standard underwriting policies. Ironically, the 
documents supplied with Mr. Neill's affidavit included a 
psychiatric report which revealed Mr. Solomon had episodes of 
suicidal depression prior to Southwest first issuing his 
$250,000.00 life insurance policy. Notwithstanding this 
knowledge, Southwest issued the policy. Judge Murphy clearly 
erred in ruling that, regardless of Southwest's prior conduct, 
Southwest would not have, as a matter of law, reinstated 
Solomon's policy. 
Specifically, the record below contained a psychiatric 
evaluation perfonned at Valley West Clinic, which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit G. On page 2 of that report, under the title 
"Past Psychiatric History", Dr. Afroz stated: 
Significant for similar episodes of depression 
ten years ago when his wife had back operation 
and she suffered a series of physical losses. Mr. 
Solomon saw a psychiatrist at that time who 
prescribed some medications, [the] name and doses 
not known at this time. (Emphasis added). 
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Judge Murphy's error is clear regardless of 
Southwestfs actual knowledge of Solomon's prior depression 
since the knowledge of Mr. Solomon's prior depression is 
imputed to Southwest if Southwest could have discovered that 
information without substantial hardship. Such was the ruling 
in the very recent Utah Supreme Court case, Hardy v. 
Prudential Insurance Company, 89 Utah Adv. Rpt., 34 (Aug. 
24, 1988). In Hardy, the Supreme Court reviewed a case where 
an insured allegedly failed to reveal a previous heart attack 
in his insurance application form. When the insured died 
fourteen months after the policy was issued, Prudential 
Insurance Company denied coverage and was granted summary 
judgment at the trial court level. Writing for a unanimous 
court, Judge Judith M. Billings stated that the appellant 
should be allowed to present to the fact finder her arguments 
that Prudential still would have issued the policy, even if 
they had known about the previous heart attack. Id, at 39. 
Judge Billings went on to state that: 
Moreover, if it is determined that the 
insurer discovered the omitted medical 
history without substantial hardship after 
the insured's death, this fact bears on the 
question of whether a reasonable 
investigation before issuance of the policy 
would have revealed the same history. 
Id. at 40. 
In the instant case, reasonable investigation by 
Southwest would have revealed Solomon's previous treatment 
for depression. Notwithstanding this actual or imputed 
knowledge, Southwest did in fact issue a whole life insurance 
policy in the amount of $250,000.00 on Solomon's life. 
-31-
This conduct by Southwest clearly indicates that 
Southwest would have reinstated Solomon's policy had he not 
committed suicide and paid his premium. Perhaps that is why 
Solomon's own counsel stated unequivocally in one of their 
motions before the trial court that "the Solomon policy would 
have been kept in force, or reinstated, if the premium had been 
paid." (Southwest1s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, at p. 9.) Having taken that position in a 
judicial proceeding and having prevailed in that proceeding, 
the plaintiffs are precluded by the doctrine of "judicial 
estoppel" from now denying that position. 
The doctrine of "judicial estoppel" is a 
rule which estops a party from playing fast 
and loose with the court during the course 
of litigation; it is not strictly a 
question of estoppel but rather simply 
means that a party is not permitted to 
maintain inconsistent positions in judicial 
proceedings; where a party assumes a 
certain position in a legal proceeding and 
succeeds in maintaining that position, he 
may not thereafter assume a contrary 
position, especially if it be to the 
prejudice of the party who has acquiesced 
in the position formerly taken by him. 
Citizens Bank v. C & H Const. & Paving Co., Inc., 552 P.2d 
796, 802 (N.M. 1976); Accord, Tracy Loan and Trust Co. v. 
Openshaw, 132 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1942). 
Solomon is now attempting to "play fast and loose" 
with the court by arguing a position for Southwest that is 
contrary to the position taken by Southwest in a prior 
judicial proceeding. This they cannot do. The position taken 
by Southwest previously, that Solomon's policy would have 




UFCI was not negligent in its handling of the 
ManuLife policy. Indeed, UFCI went to great lengths in 
order to protect the interests of Mr. Solomon. These efforts 
included the November 2, 1984 agreement between UFCI and 
ManuLife wherein Mr. Solomon's policy was to stay in effect 
during the entire second year while UFCI made back payments 
to ManuLife. 
Judge Murphy ruled that ManuLife had the right to 
unilaterally terminate this contract notwithstanding UFCI's 
arguments that the contract, written entirely by ManuLife, 
was ambiguous and contained an unlawful forfeiture clause, a 
clause Judge Murphy failed to address in his decision. In 
addition, ManuLife waived its right to unilaterally terminate 
the contract due to its consistent acceptance of UFCI's late 
payments. ManuLife never contacted UFCI prior to its 
unilateral termination and informed them that they would no 
longer accept late payments. Even after ManuLife terminated 
the contract, UFCI sent a subsequent tender to them. 
ManuLife neither applied that payment to reinstate whole life 
policies, nor did they return the payment to UFCI. 
Because the Solomon policy was in full force and 
effect during the entire second year of its existence, Mr. 
Solomon's failure to pay his third year premium prior to the 
time the policy lapsed, constitutes the sole proximate cause of 
the lapse of his policy. UFCI did not contribute to that 
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lapse, and therefore Judge Murphy erred in granting both the 
plaintiffs1 and ManuLife's Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
appellants therefore respectfully request that this Court 
reverse Judge Murphy's ruling as to both Solomon and 
ManuLife, and remand for further proceedings at the trial 
court level. 
Southwest Policy 
UFCI was not negligent in its administration of the 
Southwest policy. The Southwest policy lapsed in the third 
year of its existence because Mr. Solomon did not make his 
third year payment. Mr. Solomon had actual knowledge from 
both Southwest and UFCI that his third year payment was 
overdue and that he must make his payment immediately to 
reinstate the policy. Although making representations that he 
would make his payment immediately, he instead took his own 
life. 
By taking his own life, Mr. Solomon was 
contributorily negligent in causing the lapse of the 
Southwest policy since he had actual knowledge prior to his 
untimely death of the lapse of the Southwest policy. This is 
true notwithstanding an unidentified payment received from Mr, 
Solomon some nine months prior to the time his third year 
interest payment came due. Mr. Solomon never claimed that 
that payment was for his third year interest, and that 
argument, made in retrospect by his heirs, only creates an 
issue of fact precluding summary judgment. For those reasons, 
the appellant respectfully reqeusts that this Court reverse • 
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Judge Murphy's decision granting the plaintiff's summary 
judgment on the Southwest policy, and remand for further 
proceedings at the trial court level. 
DATED this JS^ day of AJ<!>V ' 1988. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
P. KEITH NELSON T~ N 
GEORGE T. NAEGLE 
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prepaid, this ?^5~"~ day of A/#v " , 1988 to the following: 
R. Brent Stevens 
Robert C. Keller 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
P.O. BOX 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Brent P. Lorimer 
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN 
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A D D E N D U M 
E X H I B I T A 
FiLED '.\' CLERK'S CrFiCE 
Salt L0K2 County Uran 
APR OQ 1033 
H. Dixon Hirxitgy. Clerk 3rd Cst. Court 
By ,<^/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY ROBERT SOLOMON, CAROL JUNE 
deGOLYER and DEBBIE GAYE MILLER, 
as Trustees of the Fred J. 
Solomon Family Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Canadian 
corporation, et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
SUMMARY DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CIVIL NO. C-86-311-; 
Following hearings, the court took under advisement 
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re Southwest 
Policy, third party defendant Life Insurance Company of the 
Southwest *s ("Southwest") Motion for Summary Judgment, 
plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment Re Manulife Policy and 
third party defendant Manufacturer's Life Insurance Company's 
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("Manulife") Motion for Summary Judgment. The court, having 
heard the arguments of counsel and considered their respective 
memoranda of law, hereby renders its resolutions of each morion 
in this Summary Decision and Order. A more thorough and polished 
Memorandum Decision is not necessary. 
A brief summary of the commercial context in which the 
submitted issues arise is in order. From 1930-87, University 
Financial Concepts, Inc. ("UFCI") sold whole life insurance under 
a program called "premium financing." This program involved a 
loan by UFCI to the insured of the first year's premiums on a 
whole life policy. The insured would execute a promissory note 
in favor of UFCI for the first premium. The note would be 
payable in ten annual interest payments and a balloon payment of 
the principal at the end of the ten year term. The insured would 
then assign the cash value of the particular policy to UFCI which 
would in turn invest the cash values and use them to pay 
subsequent annual premiums. UFCI committed to pay the premiums 
for a minimum of three years. 
In accordance with this premium financing program, Fred 
Solomon purchased from UFCI two whole life policies, the first on 
September 5, 1983 with Manulife as the insurer in the face amount 
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of $500,000.00, and the second on December 23, 1932 with 
Southwest as the insurer in the face amount of $250,000.00, 
For the first two years on the Southwest policy, Fred 
Solomon timely paid the interest and defendant UFCI 
correspondingly timely paid the premiums. During the second year 
of the policy on March 4, 1935 Fred Solomon apparently tendered 
to UFCI a check in the amount of $1,250.40, the exact amount of 
the third year's interest which was not due until January 23, 
1986. UFCI negotiated and deposited this check but never 
acknowledged it as a payment by Solomon of the third year's 
interest. The latter is conceded to be a mistake and resulted in 
UFCI's failure to pay the third year's premium. 
The Manulife policy presents a somewhat different factual 
circumstance. In each of the first two years of the policy UFCI 
billed Solomon for the annual interest and Solomon timely paid 
the same in September 1983 and 1984. UFCI paid the first year 
premium and failed to pay any further premiums. 
Fred Solomon died on February 15, 19 8 6 which would have been 
the third year of each of the respective policies. Each of the 
policies, however, had previously lapsed because UFCI had not 
paid the premiums and coverage was denied. The beneficiary of 
each policy was the Fred Solomon Family Trust of which plaintiffs 
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are trustees and beneficiaries. In the Third Claim for Relief of 
the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendant UFCI was 
negligent in failing to maintain the policy coverage with 
Southwest and Manulife and seek damages in the face amount of 
each policy. 
I. PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION RE SOUTHWEST POLICY 
Plaintiffs have presented undisputed testimony and evidence 
that the failure to maintain the Southwest policy occurred as a 
result, at least in part, of mistakes by defendant UFCI. UFCI 
argues that this does not establish negligence as a matter of law 
because there is no evidence it departed from any cognizable 
standard. UFCI's position is erroneous for at least two reasons: 
(1) UFCI has provided no evidence or explanation of how its 
mistakes could have occurred absent negligence; and (2) the 
undisputed evidence of UFCI's own practices, which it failed to 
adhere to in Solomon's case, establish the standard, assuming a 
standard is applicable to this case. There is, therefore, no 
genuine issue of material fact and plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment on defendant's negligence as a matter of law. 
Defendant, UFCI claims that plaintiffs' decedent, Fred 
Solomon, was also negligent and his negligence contributed to 
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UFCI's failure to maintain coverage under the Southwest policy. 
In support of its theory of comparative negligence, UFCI has 
submitted the following evidence: that after the lapse of the 
Southwest policy it made inquiry of Mr. Solomon concerning UFCIfs 
belief that Solomon had not made the required payment for the 
third year's interest; that Mr. Solomon did not indicate UFCI was 
mistaken, and he instead indicated that he would get back to 
UFCI; that Mr. Solomon thereafter committed suicide before 
recontacting UFCI. This evidence is presently undisputed and 
raises a genuine issue of fact whether Solomon too was negligent. 
Plaintiffs, however, submit that Solomon's negligence, if 
any, is not material in that it did not contribute to UFCI's 
failure to maintain or reinstate the Southwest policy. 
Plaintiffs' first claim that the undisputed evidence of UFCI's 
possession of an" unnegotiated check for the Manulife policy in 
the amount of $2,449.20 resolves this issue. If in fact UFCI was 
justifiably confused by Solomon's failure to direct its attention 
to his earlier payment of interest by check dated March 4, 1985, 
however, the existence of a different check would not resolve 
this confusion. This alternative check theory, then, does not 
render Solomon's negligence immaterial. 
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Plaintiffs next assert that any negligence attributed to 
Solomon is not material because UFCI has not established that the 
previously lapsed Southwest policy would have been reinstated. 
Plaintiffs are correct in their analysis. The evidence submitted 
by UFCI establishes only that the reinstatement of the Sclcmcn 
Southwest policy was conditioned on an acceptable application and 
payment of the premium by UFCI. Evidence of unconditional 
reinstatement or commitment thereto is necessary in order for 
UFCI to establish the relevance of any alleged negligence 
attributed to Solomon.1 Since no such evidence exists, there is 
no causal link between Solomon's negligence and the failure to 
maintain or reinstate the Southwest policy.2 Plaintiff is 
therefore entitled to the partial surinary judgment requested on 
their Third Claim for Relief relating to the Southwest policy. 
1UFCI relies on a statement in a legal memorandum submitted 
by Southwest for its assertion that reinstatement would have 
occurred. In this context, the reference in question is not 
evidence. 
2UFCIfs negligence prior to the alleged negligence of 
Solomon caused the initial lapse of the Southwest policy. UFCI, 
itself, thereby created the prospect that reinstatement was in 
doubt and speculative until actual reinstatement. 
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Plaintiffs have also moved for summary judgment on the issue 
of prejudgment interest. Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment 
interest. The date from which that interest should run, however, 
has not been established. The pertinent date is the one 
established by the applicable lapsed policy which would be the 
date of death, the date of a properly submitted proof of less or 
some other such date established by the lapsed policy or 
affirmative action by plaintiffs to collect policy proceeds. 
Plaintiffs will be required to establish the appropriate date 
from which interest should begin to run. 
II. SOUTHWEST1S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In connection with the plaintiffs1 claims premised on the 
Southwest policy, defendant UFCI filed a third party complaint 
against Southwest:. UFCI's third party claims are as follows: 
Count 1 for indemnity; Count 2 for breach of contract; Count 3 
for intentional interference with contractual relations; Count 4 
for negligent interference with contractual relations; and, Count 
5 for interference with prospective economic relations.3 Third 
JThe remaining third party claims contained in Counts 6-10 
are asserted against third party defendant Manulife and are 
addressed in Part IV of this Summary Decision and Order. 
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parry defendant Southwest has moved for summary judgment en each 
of the claims and filed a supporting memorandum and affidavits. 
Defendant and third party plaintiff UFCI has chosen not: to 
respond in writing and submitted its opposition arguments crally 
at the hearing conducted on the Southwest morion. 
In summary, the arguments of Southwest and the resolutions 
of this court with respect to each of the five claims of UFCI are 
set forth below: 
Count 1: Southwest asserts that UFCI has not 
asserted an indemnity claim because plaintiffs1 claims 
against UFCI are independent of the basis for UFCI's 
claim of indemnity against Southwest. The plaintiffs' 
claims are essentially that UFCI negligently allowed 
the Southwest policy to lapse by its failure to pay 
premiums. If UFCI is consequently liable to plaintiffs 
it cannot be said Southwest is liable to UFCI for all 
or part of plaintiffs1 claims as required by Rule 14, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Southwestfs 
cancellation of coverage was premised on the failure 
4Southwest has not asserted, as it could, that UFCI is 
limited by Rule 14, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to asserting 
in this litigation only indemnity claims. The court, therefore, 
has deemed such a position waived. 
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to pay premiums and Southwest: did nothing to cause the 
failure to pay premiums. 
Counts 2, 3, 4 and 5: The original Agency 
Agreement, upon which Count 2 and in part Counts 3, 4 
and 5 are based, is terminable at will and Southwest: 
properly invoked the termination previsions. 
Additionally, all of the claims asserted by UFCI were 
released by the terms of the Mutual Release Agreement 
of December 3, 1986 and are therefore barred. Finally, 
UFCI's claims are controlled by the forum selection 
clause of the Agency Agreement: which limits assertion 
of claims thereunder in courts extant in Dallas County, 
Texas.5 
Consequently, there are no genuine issues of material fact 
concerning the third party claims against Southwest and the third 
party defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
°Southwest has also asserted that the resolution of Utah and 
Texas litigation between UFCI and Southwest bars these third 
party claims under the doctrine of res -judicata. The court does 
not address these arguments. It appears the Utah action was not 
dismissed on the merits. Furthermore, this court is ill-equipped 
to determine whether these third party claims were compulsory 
counterclaims in the Texas action. 
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III. PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION RE MANULIFE POLICY 
The salient difference in the circumstances surrounding the 
Manulife policy when compared with those surrounding the 
Southwest policy is this: the Manulife policy lapsed in the 
second year for UFCIfs failure to pay the applicable premium. 
Because Solomon had timely paid the inreresr for the second year, 
this court's determination of UFCI's negligence as a matter of 
law in connection with the Southwest policy is equally applicable 
to UFCI's failure to pay the Manulife policy premiums in the 
second year. 
Defendant UFCI argues that the Manulife policy was 
reinstated for the second year as a result of a letter agreement 
of November 2, 1984 between it and Manulife (,f 11/2/84 
Agreement"). UFCI's theory is based on a two-step argument: (1) 
the 11/2/84 Agreement is ambiguous in that it could be construed 
that the initial payment of $50,000.00 would provide term 
coverage for one year on each of the lapsed policies, and (2) the 
understanding of Sherrell Barrett, UFCI's president, was 
consistent with this construction. There is, however, no 
evidence to support either of these two steps. 
The 11/2/84 Agreement is clear and unambiguous in indicating 
that the $50,000.00 "term payment" is not an unconditional 
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provision of tern coverage for one year on all lapsed policies. 
The 11/2/84 Agreement clearly and unequivocally indicates that 
the extended term provisions of the subject policies will remain 
in effect upon Manulife's receipt of the $50,000,00 "subject to" 
eleven specific and clear conditions. Condition 2 clearly 
indicates the extended term coverage will continue week by week, 
which belies the argument of term coverage for one policy year. 
Condition 5 required a $25,000.00 weekly payment "to continue 
coverage under the extended term insurance provision.'16 
Condition 9 provides clearly that noncompliance with conditions 
1-7 "will result in immediate termination of the extended term 
insurance coverage on all the Contracts that have nor otherwise 
been fully reinstated.11 Not only does there exist no ambiguity, 
the purported understanding of Sherrell Barrett articulated in 
his affidavit7 is contrary to his earlier deposition testimony 
and therefore does not raise a genuine issue of fact. UFCIfs 
ambiguity theory fails as a matter of law. 
bA December 11, 1984 amendment to the 11/2/34 Agreement did 
allow the weekly payments from December 10, 19 8 4 to January 7, 
19 8 5 to be made in a lump sum on January 7, 19 85. 
7It should also be noted that the Sherrell Barrett 
"understanding" does not even purport to be based on 
representations outside the 11/2/84 Agreement itself. The 
Sherrell Barrett "understanding," then is merely a 
misunderstanding of a clear and unequivocal agreement. 
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Defendant UFCI also argues that Manulife (and thus 
apparently plaintiffs) is estopped from relying on UFCIfs failure 
to adhere to the 11/2/84 Agreement because Manulife purported to 
accept late payments. . These alleged late payments apparently 
persisted not later than May. The 11/2/34 Agreement was 
terminated in the Spring of 1385 and certainly before the 
anniversary date in the Fall of 1985. Even assuming there is an 
estoppel and a waiver, such a bar does not prohibit Manulife from 
finally declaring a breach when even the late payments terminate. 
UFCI's theory of estoppel does not suspend its continuing 
obligation to adhere prospectively to the 11/2/34 Agreement. 
Manulife might well have been willing to continue to waive strict 
compliance, but UFCI did not even present such an opportunity by 
tendering further payments. An alleged estoppel or waiver in 
this context must at least be accompanied by some continued 
tendered performance. No such tender beyond the May, 19 3 5 
payment of some $18,000.00 has ever been suggested by UFCI. 
UFCI also challenges the alleged lapse in the second year of 
the Manulife policy by a most convoluted theory of forfeiture. 
Suffice it to say that this court is unwilling to redraft the 
11/2/34 Agreement so that some portion of the allegedly forfeited 
$50,000.00 can be deemed to have been applied to reinstate lapsed 
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policies. It appears that UFCI received in return fcr the 
$50r000.00 consideration in the form of extended tern insurance 
for so long as it continued to meet the other conditions of the 
11/2/84 Agreement. 
Each of defendant UFCIfs challenges to the otherwise 
undisputed lapse of the Manulife policy in its second year fail 
as a matter of law. Consequently, there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary 
judgment on the Manulife policy. Because of this ruling, the 
court need not address any issues concerning the third year of 
the policy. As with the Southwest policy, plaintiffs are 
entitled to prejudgment interest from a date to be established 
upon further proceedings. 
IV. MANULIFE1S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In Counts 6-10 of UFCI's Third Party Complaint, it asserts 
substantially the same claims against Manulife as it asserts 
against Southwest. Count 6 is the indemnity claim against 
Manulife. For the reasons stated in Parts II and III. of this 
Summary Decision and Order, Manulife is entitled to summary 
judgment on Count 6. 
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Counts 7-10 are not indemnity claims premised on defendant 
UFCI's liability to plaintiffs and are therefore not cognizable 
under Rule 14(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. These claims 
must proceed, if at all, in an independent action or by way of 
appropriate joinder. Manulife is, therefore, entitled to summary 
judgment on Counts 7-10 of the Third Party Complaint. Defendant 
UFCI has not really argued to the contrary. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs are entitled to partial summary judgment and 
third party defendants are entitled to summary judgment in 
accordance with this Summary Decision and Order. This decision 
is based on the referenced deposition transcripts, interrogatory 
answers, responses to requests for admissions and affidavits. 
This court has relied upon copies of portions of transcripts and 
other discovery responses which have been attached to legal 
memoranda rather than searching transcripts and the file for the 
referenced evidence. Consequently, counsel are cautioned to 
confirm that there is on file the original of each of the 
depositions, interrogatory responses and responses to requests to 
admit which the parties have relied upon. 
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In granting the notions, the court fully acknowledges that 
summary judgment is extreme relief and is seldom appropriate in a 
negligence case. There remain, however, some appropriate 
negligence cases in which summary judgment should be granted. 
This is just such a case. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs1 and third party defendants1 motions 
for summary judgment are granted. Counsel for the prevailing 
parties are to submit appropriate forms of order or orders in 
accordance with Third District Rule 5. 
Dated this 23th day of April, 1933. 
/MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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P r e s i d e n t , 
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6100 South 300 East, 
Suite 400, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 




This letter will serve as our offer to assist you to conserve 
the life insurance policies placed with The Manufacturers 
Life Insurance Company ("Manufacturers") by University Financial 
Concepts, Inc. ("UFCI") during 1983 that have lapsed because 
of failure to pay the second year premium (the "Contracts" 
or "Contract"). 
Under the terms of each of the Contracts, if a premium is 
not paid and the policy has a cash value, the owner can continue 
the policy as extended term insurance. In order for the extended 
term insurance provision to apply, the Contracts must have 
a cash value. Consequently, further premium payments are needed 
to provide a cash value for the Contracts. Accord-
ingly, Manufacturers agrees to allow the Contracts to rr.main 
in force under the terms of the extended term insurance provision 
of the Contracts beginning with Manufacturers* receipt from 
you of $50,000 ("the term payment") subject to the following 
cond it ions: 
1. The term payment must be received by me no later than 
the regular close of business hours on November 15, 
1984. 
2. The extended term insurance coverage will only continue 
on a week by week basis as provided below. 
3, No lives insured under the Contracts who may have died 
after their corresponding policy lapsed and prior to 
receipt by Manufacturers of the term payment will be 
insured under this offer. 
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$ 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 . H o w e v e r , a n y C o n t r a c t w i t h a 
of $ 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 or m o r e w i l l n ot be e l i g i b l e 
n d e d t e r m i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e u n t i l the a t t a c 
v i d e n c e of D e c l a r a t i o n of I n s u r a b i l i t y is 
d M a n u f a c t u r e r s ' u n d e r w r i t e r s h a v e a g r e e d 
life or l i v e s to be i n s u r e d . T h e f o r m s 
i l e d to J a c k C u m m i n s , A s s i s t a n t V i c e P r e s i d e 
, a n d a n o t e a t t a c h e d to t h e m i n d i c a t i n g 
M r . C u m m i n s w i l l r e s p o n d v e r b a l l y to y o u 
h e n c o v e r a g e b e g i n s a n d c o n f i r m t h e s a m e 
B e g i n n i n g no l a t e r t h a n s e v e n c a l e n d a r d a y s a f t e r M a n u f a 
t u r e r s r e c e i v e s the t e r m p a y m e n t , y o u w i l l be r e q u i r e d 
to p a y $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 p e r w e e k ( " w e e k l y p a y m e n t " ) to c o n t i n u e 
c o v e r a g e u n d e r t h e e x t e n d e d t e r m i n s u r a n c e p r o v i s i o n , 
a n d t h e w e e k l y p a y m e n t s w i l l c o n t i n u e u n t i l a l l the 
C o n t r a c t s h a v e b e e n f u l l y r e i n s t a t e d . E a c h w e e k l y p a y m e n 
m u s t be r e c e i v e d by M a n u f a c t u r e r s at its S a c r a m e n t o 
o f f i c e no l a t e r t h a n s e v e n c a l e n d a r d a y s a f t e r the p r i o r 
w e e k l y p a y m e n t h a s b e e n r e c e i v e d . 
T h e w e e k l y p a y m e n t s w i l l f i r s t be a p p l i e d to p r e m i u m s 
d u e o n p o l i c i e s p l a c e d w i t h M a n u f a c t u r e r s b y U F C I d u r i n g 
1 9 8 3 t h a t h a v e n o t l a p s e d a n d w h o s e p r e m i u m s a r e t h e n 
d u e . A n y e x c e s s w i l l t h e n b e a p p l i e d to t h e C o n t r a c t s 
u n d e r t h e r e i n s t a t e m e n t p r o v i s i o n o f t h e C o n t r a c t s . 
T h e C o n t r a c t s w i l l be r e i n s t a t e d b a s e d on t h e i r p o l i c y 
a n n i v e r s a r y d a t e , t h e o l d e s t C o n t r a c t s b e i n g r e i n s t a t e d 
f i r s t . In the e v e n t t h a t s e v e r a l C o n t r a c t s h a v e t h e 
s a m e a n n i v e r s a r y d a t e , r e i n s t a t e m e n t w i l l o c c u r in a l p h a t 
i c a l o r d e r . N o t i c e of r e i n s t a t e m e n t s w i l l be s e n t to 
y o u w e e k 1 y. 
Y o u w i l l p a y M a n u f a c t u r e r s a n y p r e m i u m d u e b u t n o t p a i d 
u n d e r a C o n t r a c t in the e v e n t a n y d e a t h b e n e f i t b e c o m e s 
p a y a b l e u n d e r t h e C o n t r a c t p r i o r to f u l l r e i n s t a t e m e n t 
o f t h a t C o n t r a c t. 
A f t e r a l l C o n t r a c t s h a v e b e e n r e i n s t a t e d in f u l l , a 
r e f u n d of $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 w i l l be m a d e b y M a n u f a c t u r e r s to y o u . 
In t h e e v e n t a n y of the t e r m s s e t f o r t h in t h i s l e t t e r 
a r e n o t a d h e r e d t o , no r e f u n d w i l l b e m a d e to y o u . 
F a i l u r e to m e e t a n y of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s in c l a u s e s 1 
to 7 a b o v e w i l l r e s u l t in i m m e d i a t e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e 
e x t e n d e d t e r m i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e on a l l t h e C o n t r a c t s 
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that have not otherwise been fully reinstated. Thereafter, 
any Contract that has been fully reinstated or has any 
remaining cash value will remain in force as per the 
terms of the Contracts. 
10. This offer applies only to the premiums due for the 
second policy year on the Contracts. Third, and subsequent, 
annual premiums are to be paid when due. 
11. Before this "offer can tike effect we need your confirmatior 
of the truthfulness of the following: 
(a) That neither Sherrell Berrett nor University Financia 
C o n c e p t s , Inc. are b e n e f i c i a r i e s , in whole or in part, 
under any of the Contracts to be offered extended term 
coverage under this a r r a n g e m e n t ; and 
(b) That to the best of your knowledge and belief any 
of the lives to be insured under this conditional offer 
of extended term insurance has not now become u n i n s u r a b l e . 
Your signature at the end of this letter will be construed 
by M a n u f a c t u r e r s as your a g r e e m e n t , both as President of Univer-
sity Financial Concepts, Inc. and individually, to all of 
the terms and conditions set forth in this letter and as specifi 
c o n f i r m a t i o n of the statements in clause 11 above. 
R e g a r d s , 
Rob S r a i t h e n , FSA, FCIA, 
V i c e P r e s i d e n t - U . S . F i n a n c i a l 
/kw 
I hereby agree to all of the terms and conditions set forth 
above and specifically confirm the statements set out in clause 
II a b o v e . Dated this day of November, 1984 at 
Utah. 
She r re 1 I BW'Vet c / T n T i v i dua I I y 
U N I V E R S I T Y FINANCIAI/^CO^ICEPTS, INC. 
^ f i t n e s s Sherrell Berye^t, President 
• 3 D E — — • • HMMM1 II • II II MM ICMXa—MCK 
UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS 
6100 S. 300 E. STE. 400 262-8324 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY ROBERT SOLOMON, CAROL JUNE 
deGOLYER, and DEBBIE GAYE 
MILLER, as Trustees of the 
Fred J. Solomon Family Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS 
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Civil No. C86-3117 
Judge Murphy 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ORANGE ) 
Sherrell Barrett, being first duly sworn upon his 
oath, deposes and states as follows. 
1. At all material times I was president of 
University Financial Concepts, Inc. ("UFCI"). 
2. I am familiar with the facts in this case. 
3. I am familiar with the agreement between 
UFCI and Manulife dated November 2, 1984. 
4. I was not involved in the drafting of this 
particular document. It was presented to me in a Mtake it or 
leave it" posture. 
5. It is my understanding that the initial 
$50,000 payment to be made under the terms of that contract was 
to be used to provide term insurance coverage on all policies 
that had either lapsed or were in danger of lapsing. 
6. It was my understanding that the $50,000 
initial payment was to provide term insurance coverage for the 
entire policy year of each particular policy. 
7. UFCI received a second-year policy lapse 
notice for Fred J. Solomon's policy on or about the same time 
the initial $50,000 payment was made to UFCI under the 
November 2, 1984 Agreement. 
8. It was my understanding that the second-year 
policy lapse notice was ineffective since Fred J. Solomon's 
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policy was covered by term insurance at the instant Manulife 
received the $50,000 payment from UFCI. 
9. It was not my understanding that Manulife 
could simply retain the $50,000 as a forfeiture penalty should 
UFCI fail to make its weekly $25,000 premium payments. 
10. To the best of my knowledge, UFCI was not 
notified by Manulife of those policies that were reinstated 
under the November 2, 1984 Agreement. 
11. Manulife continued to accept our $25,000 
payments, although they were not always sent out on a timely 
basis. 
12. UFCI was not notified by Manulife that 
although they had accepted the May 1985 payment of $18,000, 
they had failed to apply it to any whole life policies. 
13. UFCI was never refunded the $18,000 that 
Manulife failed to apply to any whole life policies. 
14. To the best of my recollection, UFCI sent 
the $18,000 payment to Manulife prior to the time Manulife 
terminated the November 2, 1984 Agreement. 
15. Manulife never notified UFCI that although 
Manulife had accepted late $25,000 payments from UFCI in the 
past, they would no longer do so in the future. 
16. According to UFCI's records, UFCI paid 
$293,000 to Manulife under the terms of the November 2, 1984 
Agreement. 
17. It had been my understanding up until July 
18, 1987, that Manulife had cancelled the Fred Solomon 
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policy in its third year, rather than the second year, as now 
claimed by Manulife. 
FURTHER, your affiant saith naught. 
DATED this / 5tL day of fiQr^sL- 1988. 
Sherren K/ Barrett 
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 T _ . 
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i. 12 
NAMEOf F A I H E R 
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| KINO OF BUSINESS OR INDUSTRY 
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NA*4£ of surviving tpouM (if «•(« enter rra 3en rusn« > 
,4 None 
MAIDEN NAME OF MOTHER 
„ Ethel Affleck 
I Wis coceoini e>e» i u S 
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vrs so tX ' 
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I 
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NAME ANO LOCATION OF CEMETERY OR CREMATORY 
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(A) 
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t 
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THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE 
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I 
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U cATc u' m|u(y iMontn L-v r*ar| 
2 / 1 5 / 1 ^ 8 6 
I 1 (ME Or iNJOftf 
I i"4 hourClocKi 
Unknown 
LOCATION OF INJURY-STREET AND T.UMBER OR LOCATION AND CITY CR TOWN 
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LUZL 
•w star«.a 1 ^ n r
 w»a ci "i|urv u 
jusual residoi.e u em tfl) 
»-% 0 M 
A-TuPSr 1 
YCS NO 1 
f YES *>««! vj gi co^s cared 
in determining cajaa cl death? 
res n ,0 n 
?*^ AC£ Of Njiirir o„ec ty ^or^e ti/m av. c y 
^ reet o'f ce Duild nqs etc ) 
»5 Here (Oarage) 
" • 1 
«MS «JSO<«» ory t»sisu 
drugs or tone c^micu 3 f 
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iUEaCRIBc HOW INJURY OCCUPS5D (enter sequtnoe cf events wnlcft resulted In injury, NATURE Of INJUflY SHOULD BE ENTERED IN ITEM »J „ I n h a l e d a u t o m o b i l e e x h a u s t fuTP^s 
- This is to certify that this is a true copy or the certif icate on r.le in th.b orr.ee Th.> certif ied copv is issued 
S
 under authority of sect.on 26-2 2b of the Utah Code Annotated 1953 As Amended 
5 Date Issued QX 
MAR 0 21988 
/ / J o h n E Brockert 
V DIRECTOR OF VITAL STATISTICS 
S120943 Wffiffii;^^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL EXAM\,iER 
AUTOPSY REPORT 
Case No: 36-01f 
Name: SOLOMON, Fred Age: 64 Race: White Sex: Mai 
Date and time of death: 2/15/86 - 1600 Date and time of autopsy: 2/16/36 - 09C 
An external examination is performed on the body of Fred Solomon, at the Office of th 
Medical Examiner, State of Utah, on the 16th day of February, 1986. 
EXTERNAL EXAMINATION 
The body is that of a well developed, well nourished, white male, received clad in th 
conventional fashion in a blue and green fiber filled-type coat, blue T-shirt, deni 
jeans with a leather-like belt through the loops, socks, and zip boots. The body-weigh 
85 kg, measures 1.65 meters in length, and appears compatible with the stated age of 6 
years. The body is cold, rigor is present and fixed, and red-pink livor is present o 
the dorsal portion of the body, except in areas exposed to pressure when supine. Th 
scalp hair is gray-white and straight* cut short on the sides, and measures to 7 cm ove 
the vertex. The face is clean shaven with beard stubble measuring to 0.2 cm. Th 
irides are gray-blue with the pupils symmetrically dilated to 0.3 cm. The cornea ar 
clear with the sclerae and conjunctivae unremarkable. The ears, nose, and lips ar 
unremarkable with well developed bilateral ear creases. The jaws are edentulous with a 
upper denture plate in place. The neck is unremarkable with the trachea midline. Th 
thorax and abdomen are unremarkable. The extremities are unremarkable with n 
congenital absence or traumatic deformity of the digits. The nail margins are smoot 
and clean, the nail beds bright pink. The genitalia are those of an adult circumcise 
male with the testes bilaterally palpable within the scrotum. The back i 
unremarkable. The legs are relatively hairless below the level of the knees. 
EVIDENCE OF INJURY 
As noted above, the body reveals red-pink livor, typical of carbon monoxid 
intoxication. Additionally, present on the lateral aspect of the left second finger an 
medial aspect of the left thumb is gray-black staining with abundant similar material o 
the distal third second and first finger of the right hand as well as over the knuckl 
of the right index finger. 
OPINION: This 64-year-old white male, Fred Solomon, died of carbon monoxid 
intoxication. Investigation indicates that the decedent directed automobile exhaus 
into his car while in a closed garage. 
MANNER OF DEATH: Suicide. 
E. S. Sweeney, M.D. 
Medical Examiner o 
ESS/pgs 3/1/88 ^ ^ ^ ^ . . - L - 7 - ^ ^ ^ - ' J 
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} carbomnonoxide-, j «:t:; £ i as 7\ 
j FE3 2? 1986 
/ 
RESULTS 
Blood Alcohol: Neaative 
Blood drug screen: No drugs detected, 
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E X H I B I T E 
KENT H. MURDOCK (A2350) and 
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Third-Party 
Defendant Life Insurance 
Company of the Southwest 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
GARY ROBERT SOLOMON; CAROL 
JUNE DEGOLYER; DEBBIE GAY 
MILLER; and DEBBIE GAY MILLER, 
as Trustee of the Fred J. 
Solomon Family Trust, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS, 
INC, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS, 




THE MANUFACTURERS LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Canadian 
corporation; LIFE INSURANCE 




AFFIDAVIT OF PAMELA J. FINCH 
Civil No. C-86-3117 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
^ ^ H ^ ^ - N 
STATE OF TEXAS ) 
• s s • 
COUNTY OF DALLAS ) 
Pamela J. Finch, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a resident of the State of Texas. 
2. I am a Vice-President of Policy Service of Life 
Insurance Company of the Southwest ("LSW") and have been since 
April of 1985. I was the Assistant Vice-President of Policy 
Service beginning in January of 1984. 
3. In my position with LSW, I communicate with policy 
holders concerning the payment of premiums and other policy 
requirements. 
4. I am familiar with Policy No. 148027 issued to the 
Fred J. Solomon Family Living Trust and insuring the life of Fred 
J. Solomon (the "Solomon Policy"). A true and correct copy of the 
Solomon Policy is attached hereto as Exhibit MA". 
5. The Solomon Policy was issued on December 28, 1983, 
and renewed on December 28, 1984. On both of these occasions the 
yearly premium was paid in full. 
6. Payment of the premiums for the first and second 
years of the Solomon Policy was financed in part by loans against 
the cash value of the policy. These loans were in the principal 
amount of $15,000.00 with accrued interest at the rate of 7.4% per 
annum. A copy of a statement of the loans and accrued interest 
thereon is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
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7. The Solomon Policy required payment of an annual 
premium of $15,630.00 to prevent lapse. 
8. The premium due date for renewal beyond December 23, 
1985 was December 28, 1985. 
9. The renewal premium was never paid. 
10. On December 17, 1985, I mailed a letter to the Fred 
J. Solomon Family Living Trust, c/o Fred J. Solomon, informing it 
that the annual premium of $15,630.00 and loan interest of 
$1,110.00 were due and payable by December 28, 1985. True and ~ 
correct copies of the December 17, 1985 letter, the Premium Notice 
and the Policy Loan Interest Notice enclosed are attached hereto 
as Exhibit "C". 
11. On January 22, 1986, I sent a reminder letter to the 
Fred J. Solomon Family Living Trust, c/o Fred J. Solomon, 
informing it of the same information set forth in the December 17, 
1985 letter. A true and correct copy of the January 22, 1986 
letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". 
12. On January 29, 1986, the grace period for payment of 
the annual premium expired, and the Solomon Policy lapsed as a 
result of the annual premium not being paid. A letter dated 
January 29, 1986 was sent to the Fred J. Solomon Family Living 
Trust, c/o Fred J. Solomon, informing it that the Solomon Policy 
had lapsed, and giving it an opportunity to have the Solomon 
Policy reinstated upon payment of the past due premium. A true 
and correct copy of the January 29, 1986 letter is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "E". 
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13. The application for reinstatement was never 
submitted. There was no tender of the renewal premium nor any 
attempt to have the policy reinstated. 
DATED this ^L? day of January, 1988. 
Pamela J. Finbh 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2 6 ^ day of 
January, 1988. 
My Commission Expires: yotary Pub/i 
esiding at HA U/tS .TEXAS 
2772x 
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LIFE INSUR/ O E COMPANY of & OOUTHWEST 
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P.i. ^ A 47421 • DALLAS, TEXAS 75247 • (214) 63S-( 
JANUARY 2 2 , I 9 66 
FKED J SOLOMON FAMILY LIVING TR 
XFrED J .--CLOMON 
3954 S 4000 W 
WcST VALLEY UT 84t20 
RE: PJL1CY NO. 143027 
INSURED: FRED J SOLOMON 
DEAR SIR: 
PLEASE ACCEPT CUR APCLTGY IF THIS LETTER DUPLICATES *NY 
INFORMATION YGO HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED. Wb ARE TAKING ThlS 
ACTION TO ENSURE YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF CERTAIN FACTS. 
UNIVERSITY F I N ; N C I A L CONCEPTS, INC. (UFCIJ ANL ITS REPRE-
SENTATIVE:. ARE NO LONGER AGENTS OF LIFE INSURANCE CO'-'.PANY CF 
THE SOUTHWEST. 
YOU HAY HAVE PECEIVED, 0.:. KAY RECEIVE IN THE FUTURE, A BILL 
FROM UI CI FOR LOAN r.IEREST. THIS NOTICE hluHT CONTAIN 
INFORMATION ABOUT A POLICY ISSUED BY LIFE CF THE SOUTHWEST, 
S U C H AS T H E P O L I C Y NutfetR CR OTHER I D E N T I F Y I N G I N F O R M A T I O N , 
AND IMPLIED THAT PAYMiNT OF THE AMOUNT STATED WOULD KEEP YOUR 
POLICY FROM LAPSING. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. YOU NEED TO 
RECOGNIZE THAI PAYMENT OF LOAN INTEREST FOR A NOTE YOU SIGNED 
WITH 'JFCI DOtrS NOT CONSTITUTE PAYMENT OF PREMIUM ON THIS 
POLICY, CR ANY OTHER POLICY THROUGH LIFE OF THE SOUTHWEST. 
PREMIUM PAYMENTS AND INQUIRIES SHOULD BE SENT DIRLCTLY TO LIFE 
INSURANT C D S P A N Y OF IHF. SOUTHWEST AT P.O. BOX 47421, DALLAS, 
TX 75247. IF YOU UlSf! TO SUBMIT YOUR PREMIUM PAYMENT REDUCED 
BY THE ANNUAL CAiH VALUE INCREASE OR INQUIRE AS TO Tr.E STATUS 
Or YOUR PuLlCY, PLEASE WRITE TO US CR CONTACT US BY CALLING 
OUR CUSTOMER ASSISTANCE fl.Uf.8ER (214) 638-9271. 
SINCERELY, 
PdiAu -/' M'lL 
PAMC LA J . FlNf .H 
V ICE PRESIDENT, POLICYOWNERS SERVICE 
EXHIBIT "D 
i^ir iz UN £ UL\t\!'s~" c v^uivirAiN x o; toe ^ l u u m w L.U X 
P.GSJOX 47421 • DALLAS, TEXAS 75247 • (214) 63S-7*. 
JANUARY 29, 1966 
FkEO J SCLCMCN FAMILY LIVING TR 
SFt-EO J SCLOMGN 
39S4 S 4000 * 
kEST VALLEY OT 84120 
RE: POLICY KUW6ER 148027 INSURED FRED J SCLCMCN 
DEAR SIRi 
TC SERVE YCU EFFICIENTLY AND LUICKLY. WE ARE USING TrilS C H E C K 
LIST. ONLY ITEMS MARKED • X" ARE FCR YOUR ATTENTION. 
BECAUSE YOUR PREMIUMS: 
(_> ARE NO LCNGER PAIO THROUGH 
IX) hAVE NOT BEEN RECEIVED 
l_J WERE RETURNED EY YCU* BANK, NARKEC 
{_) bEFE PAID BY Pi.EMIbM LCA,\ AND NC LOAN VALUE r.EMAlNS 
The GRACE PERIOD HAS EXPIRED, AND YOUR' VALUABLE COVERAGE: 
(I) HAS LAPSED WITH \0 ViLOE 
(X) IFFECTIV)5.J)JpCESES-.lia.i2a.5 
SO WE HAY CONSIDER REINSTATEMENT, PLEASE COMPLETE The 
EiNCLCSED APPLICATION: 
<_J iHCW ALL PERSONS CCVEPEL UNCER CuESTICN 2 
{X] ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS IN REGARD TO ALL INSUREDS 
(X) RETURN WITH YOUR REMITTANCE FOR ALL PAST CUE 
PREMIUMS Ih THE AMOUNT Of S_JL^il£LI£_ 
YCU KAY PAY FUTURE PREMIUMS B Y : 
iXi ANNUAL DIRECT $15,630.00 
(_) MONTHLY OIRECT 
(_) PREAUIH0RI2ED CHECK PLAN THROUGH YOUR BAhK 
f-cTU'KN A SIGNED 6ANK AUTHORIZATION AND VOID CHECK 
(X) _pT^_£2STP2^JSJ^ICXiOJ^2SLJS_ai^Xaia.-52LJ 
SINCERELY, 
POLICYOWNERS SERVICE DEPARTMENT 
CC: VAL 0 CHKISTCFFERSEN 
lNo MARKETING OF AMERICA LTC 
DAVID BAH^Y OCiiO 
E X H I B I T F 
P. KEITH NELSON [A2391] 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Suite 700 CSB Tower 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY ROBERT SOLOMON, CAROL JUNE 
DEGOLYER and DEBBIE GAY MILLER, 
DEBBIE GAY MILLER, as Trustees 




UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL CONCEPTS, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Sherrell K. Berrett first being duly sworn 
deposes on oath and says: 
1. I was the president of University Financial 
Concepts, Inc. (UFCI) during all materials times involved in 
this lawsuit. 
2. During the years 1983 to 1987 Pat Joos 
served as office manager of UFCI with responsibilities of 
overseeing invoices to customers and receiving payments from 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SHERRELL K. BERRETT 
Civil No. C-86-3117 
customers covering the premium financing program then in effect 
with UFCI. 
3. I am personally familiar with the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the claim by the heirs of Fred J. 
Solomon. 
4. I personally reviewed Exhibit flEff which was 
attached to plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
which Exhibit purports to be a check dated March 4, 1985 
payable to the order of UFCI over the signature of Fred J. 
Solomon. 
5. That both Pat Joos and I made a diligent 
search of all records of UFCI to ascertain if Mr. Solomon 
had been billed for an interest payment during the months of 
January, February or March, 1985. No such invoices were 
found. We have further looked for independent documentation 
that the above referenced check had ever been receipted by 
UFCI. We found no such documentation. 
6. I had no information from any source until 
reviewing Exhibit "E" that any allegation was being made by the 
plaintiffs that if the interest payment for the third year note 
due in December, 1985 had been paid. In fact, all my 
information up to the time that I reviewed Exhibit "E was to 
the contrary. I had numerous contacts with Mr. Solomon's 
insurance agent, Val Christopherson, during the later part 
of 1985 and the early part of 1986 up to Mr. Solomon's death 
on February 16, 1986. The subject matter of those 
conversations pertained to the necessity of Mr. Solomon 
2 
reinstating his insurance policy with Life Insurance Company of 
the Southwest which reinstatement included payment of the 
interest on the note for the year 1985-1986. At no time did I 
receive any information from Mr. Christopherson that Mr. 
Solomon had allegedly prepaid the interest. 
7. I personally spoke with Mr. Solomon on the 
Monday before his death in February/ 1986 in which I reiterared 
the necessity of his paying interest on the third year of the 
note which was already overdue. He promised that he would have 
a check to me by the end of that week. He made no mention 
whatsoever that the interest payment had previously been paid 
in March, 1985 or at any time during the year 1985. 
Mr.Solomon died that weekend without ever making the interest 
payment, to my knowledge. 
DATED this jfy+X day of October, 1987. 
SHERRELL K^ (BERRETT 
,, , t SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this /^*day of 
flmfaA. . 1987. 
My Commission Expires: ifDTARY" PUBLIC . // 
/ResTding at: J /ju(* ///#/. 
3 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
on this ^Tn day of CH^kjJUT , 1987, to the following 
counsel of record: 
H. Ross Workman, Esq. 
Brent P. Lorimer, Esa. 
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN 
American Plaza II, 3rd Floor 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
W. Jerry Ungricht, Esa. 
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEMER 
Suite 520 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Roger P. Christensen, Esq. 
Roger R. Fairbanks, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
}
ahA \ o U^OLAJU? 
SOLOMON9/PKN 
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E X H I B I T G 
SALT'LAKc^OUNTY. MENTAL HEALTH 
VALLEY WEST CLINIC 
PIONEER PROFESSIONAL PLAZA 
4250 WEST 5415 SOUTH 
KEARNS, UTAH 84118 
957-4405 
Robert L Warbunon, M.O. Estelia S. Hoasiana. LC.S.W. 
Clinical Director Unit Manager 
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION 
NAME: Fred Solomon 
DATE: 11/4/85 
ID#: 01-72200 
PRIMARY THERAPIST: Barbara Allem 
IDENTIFICATION 
Fred Solomon is 65 year old Caucasian, widdower, retired 
Kennecott boiler operator, living in West Valley by himself. 
He was referred for psychiatric evaluation by Barbara Allem, 
L.P.N. 
CHIEF COMPLAINT 
I lost my wife in January 19 85. I need some medication. 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS 
Mr. Solomon lost his wife of 4 5 years in January this year, 
after that there is a downhill course of his emotional 
a psychological health. He is experiencing dysphoric mood, 
forgetfulness, low energy level, anhedonia, excessive tired-
ness, and occasional suicidal ideation. He was being treated 
by his cousin and a family surgeon after the death of his 
wife and in early April this year Mr. Solomon was hospital-
ized at Cottonwood Hospital for suicidal ideation and depres-
sion, he was referred and recommended by Dr. Fogg. The 
patient states that he was started on Amitriptyline in 
the hospital and says that he has been taking them regularly 
with slight improvement in sleep pattern but dysphoric 
mood and low energy level still persists. He increased 
his Amitriptyline does to 125 mg. and later to 15 0 mg. 
and experienced some side-effects like constipation, blurred 
vision, dry mouth and light headedness, also he has been 
experiencing delays instarting urination, however denies 
any retention of urine, he denies any change in appetite 
however, states he has lost a few pounds of weight in the 
last few months. He is experiencing guilt as well as 
severe depression, more so early in the morning but as 
Dennis McSharry. Ph.D. 
Associate Oirector 
CONFfOSMTfAL 
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Psychiatric Eva nation 
Fred Solomon 
day goes on his depression improves but never to his pre-
morbid state. He is not only concerned but would like 
to get a treatment only with medication and not at all 
motivated for any psychotherap&iiic intervention. He appears 
as a man who has limited psychological awareness and prob-
ably not at all interested in getting any psychological 
support. 
PAST PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY 
Significant for similar episodes of depression 10 years 
ago when his wife had back operation and she suffered a 
series of physical losses. Mr. Solomon saw a psychiatrist at 
that time who prescribed some medications name and doses 
not known at this time. Also past psychiatric history 
signficant for hospitalization in Cottonwood Hospital for 
a week in April this year for severe depression with suicidal 
ideation. 
MEDICAL HISTORY 
He denies any problem with blood pressure, denies any ..cardiac 
problem, diabetes or any other medical or surgical conditions. 
He had Hemorrhoidectomy 15 years ago. No Known allergies. 
FAMILY HISTORY 
He recalls being very close to the family. Father died 
in 1969 and there is no family history of any psychiatric 
problem. 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL HISTORY 
Nothing significant, denies any use or abuse of drugs or 
alcohol. 
CURRENT MEDICATIONS 
Amitriptyline 125 mg. QHS. 
MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATION 
65 year old Caucasian male, appears as stated age with 
eyeglasses in somewhat unkempt and dishelved apperance. 
Very anxious, restless and tense, depressed mood, affects 
depressed to anxious. Very poor attention and concentration 
couldn't do serial 7, similarties fair to good, judgement 
intact by formal testing proverbs concrete. Poor fund 
of information. This man has an average intelligence as 
test by interview. Use of vocabulary, language and' fund 
of information, .his responses were basically •concerned 
with his depression and medication, as a means of rel^Oving 
his depression and nothing else. He. had a poor attention 
span, somewhat drifting during converstfirho-- frequent:, -change 
of posture due to reslessness, thoughts were goal directed 
£OMPf0©mAL 
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no hallucination, delusion, thought insertion or broad-
casting. He denies any suicidal or homicidal ideation. 
IMPRESSION 
This patient has suffered a serious loss of a loving realticn-
ship and such reaction is not unusual under conditions 
that Mr. Solomon is in currently, that is, retired lonely 
and old age. I seem- him as having Major Depression witn 
Meloncholia expecially with the characteristic style of 
depression which is worse in the morning , increasing guilt 
and anhedonia with no pleasure in any activity. 
AXIS I Major Depression with Meloncholia 
AXIS II None 
AXIS III None 
AXIS IV Severe 
AXIS V Good 
RECOMMENDATION 
Considering the side-effects of Amitriptyline at 125 mg. 
QHS will discontinue Amitriptyline and start Doxepin Hydro-
cholride 100 mg. QHS for 1 week and then tritrate it to 
150 mg. QHS. It seems that Mr. Solomon has an agitated 
componante to his depression along with a lot of anxiety 
and Doxepin seems to be the medication of choice at this 
time. I will also add Xanax .25 mg twice a day for 1 week 
only. If the patient continues to have side-effects of 
a Tricyclic an^i-depressant then probably will consider. 
D£sipramine^ Meratol and Traxadone later with less <v^^^u-^«. 
side-effects. Patient advised to return to clinic 
after 1 week for a close follow-up of medication. Risks, 
benefits and side-effects explained to the patient. 
2. Patient is not psychologically aware and is resistant 
to any kind of therapy. I have encouraged patient to come 
and see the primary therapist for individual therapy short 
term and then to go into# group. He seems very resistant 
however, I will keep re-enforcing this idea about therapy. 
in jpy future meetings with this patient. 
Syed M. Af roz /TSTUT 
SMA/kl _^ 
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